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Equality, Efficiency,
and Market Fundamentals:
The Dynamics of International
Medical-Care Reform
DAVID M. CUTLER'
1. Introduction
I
s NO COUNTHV are people particularly
happy with their health-care system. In a
survey ol people in ficveial countries, Karen
Donelan and colleagnes asked respondents to
react to the statement: "On the whole, the
heLilth system works prett\' well, and only mi-
nor changes are necessary to make it work
better" (Donelan et al. 1999). In the United
States, only 17 percent of people agree with
the statement; 83 percent perceive the need
for "fimdamonta! change" or "complete re-
building."" In Canada, with universal insur-
ance coverage and medical spending as a
share of CIDP at 70 percent ofthe U.S. level,
only 20 percent ol people agree with the
statement. In the United Kingdom, with
.spending us a share of (iDP at hall the U.S.
le\ el and overall health nieitsures just as good,
only 25 percent agree with the statement. In
' Department ol FLConomics. Harvard University,
aud NBER. I am graletn! to Monica Sinf^luil lor expert
researcb a.ssist;uice. to Jobn McMillan and tbree anony-
nions reterees tor belpfnl comments, and to tbe
National Institutes on Aiding lor researcb support.
- Tlic otber response.s ure: "There are .some good
tilings in our health-care system, but lundamental
fhanecN are needed to make it work better," and "Our
heidtli-care sy.stein lias so mucli wrong witb it that we
d to coiripletely rebuild it."
AustnUia and New Zieiiland, support is 19 per-
cent and 9 percent respectively. Granted,
health care is a diffieult issne for societies. Bnt
why such great discontent?
Medical care is snch a problem, I argue,
beeanse it is fundamentally a setting of con-
ilicting goals. Methca! systems developed
with clear equity considerations. In most de-
veloped conntries, universal insurance cov-
erage was designed to guarantee equal ac-
cess to medical care for all. Solidarity in
health care dictated no rationing by price.
The classic tradeoff in economics is be-
tween equity and efficiency, and this shows
up in medical care. Efficiency was not a
great concern when health systems were es-
tablished; conntries were content to have in-
efficient medical-care systems provided they
treated all equally.
But the equality-efficiency balance has
been thrown into conflict by the fnndamen-
tals of the medical-care market. Medical
eosts have increased rapidly over time, as
technological change has expanded the ea-
pability of medicine. Since 1960, medical
care has more tban doubled as a share of
GDP. The result of this technological change
is that govennnents face increasingly severe
finaneing erises. Many countries can no
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lotiger afford the coiiimitnient to complete
equalit)' tliat they once coiikl.
The Rrst response of most countries to the
problem of rising costs was the enactment of
regtilatoty limits on costs. These hmits were
incrcLisingly pre\a]ent in the 1970s and
1980s. Govemtnents reduced provider fees
and rationed access to medical technolog)'.
Cost growth slowed quite a bit. Compared
to the United States, which never had wide-
scale limitations, medical costs in other de-
veloped countries teli from about 90 percent
of the U.S. level as a share of GDP to about
65 percent of tliat level. Further, health out-
comes did not seetn to stiffer. A decade into
these rationing systems, overall satisfaction
with medical eare was higli.
But recent years have made the regulatoiy
solution increasingly less attractive. The
mareli o( tcchnologv' has continued, even in
regulated systems. Mediciil-care cost growth
resnmed when expenditure controls were not
actively being tightened. Further, cost con-
trols have nuide the lack of efficiency more
noticeable. Waiting lines and access testric-
tions have become increasitigly important is-
sues as the constraints increase in intensity.
As a result, the regulatoiy solution to med-
ical care is cotiiing tmder disfavor. In many
countries, there is an incipient movement
away from regnlation arid towards market-
based solntions to medical-care problems.
Countries are introducing competition into
medical care and in some cases providing in-
centives for people to ttse less medical care
and to choose less-expensive health insurance
plans. Providers are being asked to consider
costs in their care decisiotis as well.
Iiieentive reforms bring the potential for
cost savings withottt painful pulilie cuts. That
is why countries are attracted to them. But
incentive reforms bring conflict as well,
Priee-govenied systems are not as equitable
as the older systems they replace. The poor
do not have the sauie access to medical care
as the rich when prices are used to ration
care. Fttrther, less-healthy people may suffer
compared to the healthy. And incentive sys-
tetns may restrict access to some pro\'iders.
One way that money is saved in medieul eare
is to limit the providers one contracts with,
and n.se the exclusiou power to negotiate
lower prices. But abandoning the commit-
ment to equality" of access is not easy. As a re-
sult, there has been great reluctance to tise
competitive measures to their fullest extent.
Many countties are tiow exploring the proper
scope and applieation of incetitives in med-
ical care. How couutries resolve this debate
will have major implications for the worlds
niedical-eare systems for decades to come.
In this paper, I trace tlic histoiy oi interna-
tional niedical-eate reform and lay out the is-
snes today. I begin in section 2 with a discus-
sion ofthe birth ol ttuiversal systetns. Section
3 then examines the move to controls and
rationing. Seetion 4 considers the effects of
expenditure constraints on the prtnision
of medical eare. Section 5 discusses the
problems with rationed systems, and section 6
examines the new wave of reform.
2. The First Wave of Hectlth-Care Refomi:
Universal Coverage and Ecfual Access
The late nineteenth centurv' saw the be-
ginnings of health insurance in most devel-
oped countries.'^ Mutual aid societies, or
sickness fimds, were formed for some work-
ers, In some coutitries, snch as Geriuauy,"*
the development was spurred by the central
government. More frequently it took place
ill the pri\ate sector.
But even ;is late as \\'orld War 2, access to
medical care was not a paitieularly high prior-
it\' for tJie public sector. In part, the desire for
'^ M("cliail aiR' is (.lifft^re'iit in cle\'flo[>ed and dcvt'lop-
ing countries. My ston- is largely one of rich, developed
countries, where generous insurance systeuis arc af-
fordable and desirable. Thus. I aniilyze the OECID
countries, paiiicnlarly the CiT,
In his ijuest for riation-iniikliiig in the late 19th ceii-
tun, Bismarck feared that tniddle-cliLSS CJeniiaus would
snpport sofiiJists n\'er the monarchy. He thus introduced
a series of .social insurance programs—most prominentlv
old-age insurance and he;iltli insurance—to gi\'e the niitl-
dle-cliiss a stake in the snr\i\;il of the govenmient, David
Cnller and Hiehiud Johnson (21H)I) disenss ihe biitli of
sociiil insurance progranLS in more detail.Cutler: International Medical-Care Reform 883
medical insurance was limited because tliere
wiLs little that medical care could do foi" sick
people. Panl Starr (1982) traces the tnuisfor-
mation ol the American medical system. Starr
notes that medical knowledge was poor in this
period, ancl it was not until the mid twentietli
centnrv' that tlie medicii! profession was seen
as a significant laetor in helping to cure dis-
ease. In atldition, medicid insiiranct^ was rarely
high in families' economic priorities beeanse
niftlic'ul costs were not particularly variable.
With little to do lor sick people, the financiiil
risk dissociated with being siek was low. Tbe in-
surance that was available for sickness fre-
qnently covered lost wages, not medical costs.
World War 2 cbanged the situation sub-
stantially (Starr 1982). Advances in penicillin
and other antibiotics convinced people that
medical care was Viilnable. Conntries wanted
to reward tbemselves for years of strnggle.
Qnasi-socialist governments elected after the
war wanted to expand tbe role oftlie state in
tbe provision of basic needs. The result was a
major emphasis on expanding health insur-
ance coverage. Table 1 sbows tbe creation ol
national medical-care systems in G7 eoim-
tries.'^ Tbe lirst post-war reform was in tbe
United Kingdom. The Beveridge Report of
1942 delineated tbe inadequacies of tbe
prior system aud recommended a goal of na-
tional bealtb insurance coverage.*"" Tbis goal
was met in 1946, witb the passage of tbe
National Ilealtb Sendee (NHS) Act; tbe
NIIS began formal operation iu 1948.
Tbe Britisb system was followed, some
years later, by tbe Japanese system
•' Nniricrons cl;itu soiirfes were n.sed in creating tbe
tiilile.s ol"conntr\' features. Tbe OECD (19^51 and
Roenier (I9i)l) ]i;i\e nnit-li inlornmtion, along witb
cite.s to otlu'r articles witb more lietail.s.
'' In 1941, an iiiterdcpartTnciitjil connnittce on Social
Iiisinance and Allied Senices w;i.s appointed to .survey
the existing schenie.s ol social in.suranee. Tbe eoniinis-
sioii made a "diagnosis ot want" by snr\ eying conditions
ol liie in a nnnihcr ol towTis in Britain. Tbe Beveridge
Report ci)nclnded that abolition of want required a re-
distribntion ot ineonic tbrougb scK'ial insuraiicc and by
taniily Tieeds. Tlif report rfconiuiended a (.•oniprchcn-
sive national health service to provide lull ai'ces.s to all
beneficial treatments without economic barriers
(Beveridge t942>.
(1958-61), tbe Canadian .system (1966-71),
and tbe Frencb system (1967). In all of tbese
conntries, universal coverage was tbe cnlmi-
nation of many years of partial coverage and
government subsidies for insurance. More
recent universal systems were finally
acbieved in Italy (1978) and Germany, al-
tbougb in both cases coverage rates were
veiy bigb just prior to tbe universal legisla-
tion (Milton Roemer 1991). Tbe only C7
conntnwitbout a universtil bealtb insurance
program is tbe United States, altbough it
does bave a program for tbe elderly
(Medicare) aud a program for the poor
(Medicaid). Indeed, within the OECD
(prior to its recent expansion), only Turkey
and tbe United States were witboiit nniver-
sal insurance coverage.
Beyond jnst desiring universal coverage,
countries wanted to ensure that tbe poor
bad tbe same access to medical care as tbe
ricb. Medical care was perceived as a rigbt,
not a good, and markets were not looked
upon witb favor. For example, tbe Beveridge
Commission stated. "From tbe standpoint of
Social Security, a bealtb serviee providing
fnll preventive and cnrative treatment of
eveiy kind to every citizen without excep-
tions, witbout remuneration limits and witb-
ont an econoune barrier at any poiut to delay
recourse to it, is the ideal plan" (Part VI, see.
437). Similarly, tbe Canada Healtb Act of
1984 stated. "It is bereby declared tbat tbe
priniar) objective of (^ianadian healtb care
policy is to protect, promote, and restore tbe
pbysical and mental well-being of residents
of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access
to healtb services witbout fniancial or otber
barriers" (cb. 6, sec. 3).
Tbese sentiments bad fundamental impli-
cations for tbe design of medical-care sys-
tems. Tbey led medical systems to be ex-
tremely generous iu covered services aud
low in required cost-sbaring. At least tbis
was true for acnte medical care, wbicb tvpi-
eally aeeounts for about 70 percent of total
spending. Table 2 sbows tbe cbaracteristics
of universal bealtb insurance systems884 Jotimal of Econotnie Literature, Vol. XL (September 2002)
TABLE ]
TUECREATU)\ OF UM\'i:ii,s,\i,Cu\L:h,\(;E SVSTKMS
Iiistor\' of Insurance Coverage
Canada
France
CeiiTiiinv
Italy
United Kingdom
United States
1947: First provincial health insurance program
1966: Medicare established
1971: Last province enacts Medicare,
Late 19'" centur\: Loeal sickness timds for certain workt^i\s
1928: Compulsory liealth insurance for low-wage workers in certain industries
1967: National insurance tund for salaried workers: agricultnnil and self-employed
covered by other funds
1978: Universal coverage achieved.
1 SS.3: Industrial workers u1th low wages covered fiy sickness fuiuLs
1981: 90% coverage achieved, (Coverage remains at approximately 9()% today.
Post-W'W'II: Mutual aid societies converted to local branches of national insurance
program (by 1970s, 90% coverage)
1978: National heallh service created.
1922: Health Insunmce Law covered some workers (extended in 1938)
1958: National Health insurance mandated
1961: All local go\eninients implement.
1911: Maimal workers and low-wage w{)rkers covered
Coverage increased over time:
1946: National health insurance pas,sed
1948: NHS implemented.
1965: Medicare and Medicaid created.
around the 198()s and early 199()s." In al-
most all countries, covered benefits were
very generotts. It is easier to report the ser-
vices excluded from coverage than the ser-
vices incktded. Excluded services iueluded
dental care in some countries, visiou and
bearing aids, and oceasionally otttpatient
prescription dnigs. In countries where these
services were excluded as a genera! rule,
sueh as Canada and the United States, the
pnblic set-tor sometimes covered the costs
for the poor. Indeed, some countries had
stieh generous services that they covered spa
betiefits (Germany).
' The United States row in ta!)Ie 2 reports the provi-
sions of the Medicare program, Medieaid programs
were more generou.s at tnis time.
Furthet; there were few restrictious on us-
ing covered seiMces. In all countries, pa-
tients had free choiee of primary care
providers, and cost-sharing for covered ser-
vices was minimal. In many countries
(Canada, Cermany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom), access to some or ail physieians
and hospitals is nearly free. Among these
coimtries, only Italy has any cost-sharing for
specialist physicians, but the cost-sharing is
quite modest. Prescription drugs are some-
what less well insured but often still covered.
Three of the conntries (France. Japan,
and the United States) have more extensive
cost-sharing. In France, coinsnrauce rates
ior pliysician senices are 25 pereent, al-
thongh 80 percent oi the population has stip-
plemental itisttrance to cover the pliysieianTin;
TABLE 2
!>!• HKMTII I\SL K.-\M:E SYSTEMS AHOIM.) 19S0
Demand-side SiippK-sidc
Cost Sharing For:'
Exclusions Primary Oulpati<'ul
from Care Pharma- Hospital Hospital
Country Coverage" Phy.sician Specialist Hospital ueiiticals Ownership Payment
(Canada Outpatient
tieutal am!
pharitiiifeiitiaJ;
soniepn)St!ieses;
glasses ami
None None None X'arie.s h\'
province
Over 95'2
private
Clohal
budget
Payment
Fce-for-
service
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U.K.
U.S.
Fei'-for-
Eyeglasses,
some dent;il
care
None
None
Inocnlatirjiis;
eyeglasses
Dental
aud \isi()n
Out
None
None
1(^30%
None
patient
pharinaueu-
Heals: nnitine
tiental and
\isiiiii; long-
Noti': " Stjine exceptions are inatle
25% S.5-SKpei-
da\' aud
2()9f up to
30 days
None S3 for 14
(Li\Ti (niiuiv
exemptions)
S7-$8 None
(max
ofSi41)
10-309* 10-30%
None S4-S5
Deductible ($100);
eoiiismance (20%i)
,SS()O)
for the elderlv and poor.
30% to 6O9'(
S1.25/dn,g
{witb
eiiceptions)
0 to 50%
1O-3O9'(.
None
Deduct ibl
(about
puliiic
Pnl)lic(:5.5%)
and private
(6.5%)
V!ost pnlilic
(>507<)
Mostly pul)lic;
some
religions or
uiiiversitv
Mostly
pri\'ate
(80%.); some
large pnblkr
teaehiug
hospitiils
I'ublie
Public
hospitals
have a
global
limlget;
pri\-ate fee-
for-service
Per diem
Per diem
Fee-for-
service
Global
budget
MostK'
private; service
siiuie
""Cost sbaring is around 1993.
PredoDi-
inantK
fee-for-
serviee
(salary in
pnlilic
sector)
Fee-for-
service in
ambulatory
sector;
salary in
hospital
sector
f:apitation
for GPs;
salarv or
other for
specialists
Fee-for-
service in
ambulatory
sector.
salar\- in
hospital
sector
Salaiy
Fee-f"or-
service886 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XL (Septetnber 2002)
cost-sharing {OECD 1995), Hospital cost-
sharing is much lower. In Japan, coinsurance
rates are 10 to 30 percent for all services. In
Medicare in the United States, cost-sharing
for physician services is relatively small, hut
cost-sharing for hospitals is much larger
(there is a deductible of one day of hospital
care—about SSOO currently), and outpatient
prescription drtigs are not covered at all.
Still, many elderly have supplemental insur-
ance to pay for these costs.
The result was tliat in most countries,
there were very few demand-side con-
straints on utilization. As one indicator of
this, the government paid for 72 percent of
medical care in the average G7 country, and
76 percent outside the United States. Social
and not individual financing was the goal.
Economists might worry about moral haz-
ard, hut governments were more worried
about equity.
On the supply side, the systems were en-
couraging as well. In five of the coimtries—
Canada, France (outside the public sector),
Germany (ambulatory care), Japan (ambn-
latory care), and the United States—physi-
cians were predominantly paid on a fee-for-
service (piece-rate) basis. In such a system,
doctors that do more collect additional in-
come; provided price is above marginal
cost, the incentives to limit care to situa-
tions where it is truly appropriate arc
weak.^
A second alternative is to salary physi-
cians. This was the route chosen in the
United Kingdom and for selected specialties
in France (public sector), Cermany {Jiospi-
tal-based physicians), Italy (hospital-based
physicians), and Japan (specialists). Even
salaried physicians had weak incentives to
hmit spending; doctors did not suffer fhian-
cially if unnecessary care was provided.
** George Bernard Shaw (1911) laiiiented tbis almost
a eentury ago: "That any sane nation, having ohse'rveti
tiiat yon eoiild provide for tbe supply ol bread b)' giving
haker.s ;t pee^uliar^• interest in baking for you, should go
on ti) give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in eiittinj^ oH'
your leg, is enough to make one despair of political
nil inanity."
A third alternative chosen in some coun-
tries is to pay physicians on a capitation ba-
sis—doctors receive a fixed amount of
money per patient in return for providing
medical services as needed, at no additional
charge for each service. Included in the cap-
itation amount is the physicians' own time
and sometimes other services such as hospi-
tal care or prescription drug costs. Italy and
the United Kingdom used this payment sys-
tem for some doctors. Capitated systems can
provide strong incentives to limit medical
costs. But the capitated systems countries
put in place were generally not very strin-
gent. Many nouphysician services were not
included in the capitation amount; surplus
ftmds could not be retained by the doctor;
and the ability to negotiate with downstream
providers was limited. No country had a sys-
tem like what is evolving in the United
States today, where doctors are at risk for
most of the care their patients receive and
have large income fluctuations on that basis.
As a result, access to physician services was
largely unconstrained.
Hospital payment was also relatively gen-
erous, although more diverse. In many
countries, the public sector ran at least some
of the hospitals. The extent of public owner-
ship ranged from very little (Canada, the
United States, and Japan—20 pereent or
less) to more moderate levels (France—35
percent; Germany—over 50 percent) to
nearly all of the hospital system (Italy, the
United Kingdom). In countries where the
publie sector ran the hospitals, hospitals
were topically financed as line items in the
budget. When hospitals were private, they
were often paid through global budgets-^
hospitals were given a fixed auiount of funds
for the year to cover the costs they incurred
in caring for tlieir patients. Global budgets
were often coupled with public review of
hospital investment decisions, for example
for bed expansion or purchase of capital
eqviipnient.
Global payment systems can be constrain-
ing-—and later were—but frequently wereCutler: Intemationai Medical-Care Reform SS7
not at tlif time tlir systems were set up.
Oltcn, the puhlic sector paid for hospital
deficits at the end of the year, as in Italy. In
other cases, the global budgets were ad-
justed for costs in previous years or were set
at deliberately high levels. Still other eoun-
tries had fee-for-service payment for hospi-
tals (Japan, the United States), creating the
same iucentives on the inpatient side as they
did on the outpatient side.
Arthur Okiui (1975) highhghted oue of
the classic tradeoffs in eeouoniics, between
efficiency and distributiou. Achieving a
more equal tlistribntion ot resources than
markets naturally provide geuerally requires
inakiug markets less effieient. Iu the med-
ieal-care context, distributiou was a clear
priority over effieieuey. Eveu the rhetoric of
universal insurauce coverage stressed distri-
butional equity over economie effieietiey. By
1980, countries in the GT, and in the devel-
oped world as a whole, had set up niedieal-
eare systems designed to encourage access
to Tuedieal eare but not t(j promote the offi-
cieut deliveiy oi care.
3. The Seeotid Wave: Controls, }^
and ExfX'tuliftin- Caps
\\ itii few constraints on inedieai-care de-
inaiul or supply, medical speuding was
bound to be inefficient. Countries were
willing to accept speudiug ahove efficient
levels to uieet distributional goals. But
spending was also growing more rapidly
tliau eouutries eould easily afford. While
tax revenues were inereasiug at the rate of
payroll or consumption growth, roughly the
rate of GDP growth, medical care speud-
ing was increasing twice as rapidly. In the
average OECD country, medical care rose
from 3.8 pereent of GDP iu 1960 to 7.2
perctMit in 1980.
Medieal-care costs were increasing so
rapidly in large part because of tlie growing
teehnieal sophistication ol medical prac-
tice. The development of new teehnoiogies
aud the diffii.siou of those technologies to
more patients led to large increases in
spending. Empirical estimates by Joseph
Newhouse (1992) suggest that techuologi-
cal change accounts for at least half of over-
all cost growth, with the remainder result-
ing from inereased prices of services and
increased use of existing teehnoiogies be-
cause ot the spread of insurance. Sinee the
expansion in technology was worldwide, or
perhaps U.S. driven, no other country
could control its rate.
Figure 1 shows the inerease in the per-
centage of GDP claimed by health care over
various decades; tahle 3 shows summary
data. I examine spending relative to GDP to
account for the income effect of medical
care. As countries get richer, they naturally
spend more on medical care. International
eomparisons of medical spending geiierally
suggest an income elasticity at or ahove 1
(Getzeu 2001), so it is natural to look at
spending as a share of GDP.
The tirst bars in figure 1 are for the 1960s.
In the CT7 countries, with the exeeption of
the Uuited Kingdom (discussed helow),
medieal spending as a share of GDP in-
ereased substantially in this decade. Even
iueludiug the Uuited Kingdom, the increase
averaged 1.6 percentage points. The in-
erease wiis not limited to the G7 countries,
as table 3 shows. Spending in the rest of the
OEGD increased hy 1.3 percentage points.
The pattern was repeated in the 1970s.
Essentially all countries, with the exceptiou
of Ganada, experienced rapid increases in
medical costs. The average growtb was again
1.6 percent of GDP.
As medical spending increased, the bur-
den on the puhlic sector grew. Tiix increases
to pay for rising medical costs were increas-
ingly painful. Eurther, the mid-1970s saw a
reduction of income growth and the begin-
ning ol structural puhlic deficits. This CUTI-
vinced countries that they needed to man-
age their medieal spendiug more actively.
The result was a gradiuil shift away from
concentrating on the generosity of coverage
and toward containing the eost of care.888 Jonnial of Economic Literatnre, Vol. XL (September 2002)
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Fif!,tiir 1. Increase in Medical Care a.s a Sliare of CIDP
Stnirre: Data ATV from OECD (2(HI(n. Duta f(ir Ceniianv itre iiiissiiiK [or lUfiOs. Last VL^r of data is
UK US
Where "iiceess to medieal eare" liatl oiiee
been the pritnan' focits of public policy, "cost
containment" became equally itTiportant.
There are tvvo potential strategies for cost
containment. First, incentives can be usetl
to indnce people to spend less. Some ser-
vices miglit no longer he covered hy the
public progiain, or cost-sharing might he in-
creased. At the level ofinsurance purchases,
people can he given financial incentives to
choose less-generous insurance plans, with
lower overall cost.s. Doctors can also be
given stronger financial incentives tt> pro-
vide less care. Alternati\ely, .spending can he
constrahied through regulation. Access to
technologies can he restricted, or expendi-
ture caps imposed. Spending will thus be
lowered by fiat.
Regttlation was the soltition chosen in es-
sentially all couutries. The details ot the im-
plementation varied somewhat across coun-
tries and types of services, hut the principles
were similar. Tahle 4 shows the nature of
these conttol measttres. In the hospitiil sec-
tot; countries with giohal btidgets tightened
the budget limits. Hospitals had to live vvith
less-rapidl\ increasing funds. Tliis was often
coupled with tighter constraints on hospital
investment antl capacity expansion, to en-
sure that aggregate utilization would not ex-
ceed what was affordahle.
Budgeting physicians is more difficult
than htidgeting hospitals, since it is not feasi-
ble to make individtial physicians hear all of
the costs for services ttsed by their patients
(hiring tile year. But alternative mechanisms
are available. Many governments, for exam-
ple Germany, imposed an overall spending
limit for physician services as a whole or hy
specialty. Different activities were then as-
signed relative weights, reflecting the re-
sources involved in providing the services.
The equilihrium price per tinit weight is set
ex post to meet the overall budget. In otherCutler: International Medical-Care Reform 889
c;7
RestofOKCD"
1960
4.2
3.6
TABLE 3
1970
5.S
1.9
° Excludes Tiirkev and countries that joined the OECD in the
Source: OECD i'lOlX)).
SliAHE ()!• GDP
t980
7.4
7.1
1990s.
1990
8.5
7.6
1996
9.4
S.l
cases, fee schedules were tightened, but
without an explicit spending target in mind.
These types ot expenditure controls re-
quire suhstantial government involvement
in tlie medical system, and countries covild
not implement them fully until the pnblic
sector had enough authority over the system
to carry out the task. Thus, the evolution of
regvilation necessarily followed universal in-
surance coverage. The earliest country with
universal coverage, and the first to imple-
ment tight constraints, was the United
Kingdom. British doctors were paid on a
salary or capitation hasis, and the puhlic sec-
tor ran the hospitals, sinee the estahlishment
of the NHS. Thus, the British government
was in a nattiral position to implement con-
trols. Dnring the 1960s, governinent con-
straints led cost growth in the United
Kingdom to he suhstantially helow the rate
in other countries (figure 1).
C^anada adtjpted spending limits in the
1970s, following the estahlishment of uni-
versal coverage in the late 1960s. Giohal
hndgets on hospitals were put in place when
universal coverage was enactetl, and provin-
cial governments used this payment author-
ity to limit cost increases. As figure 1 shows,
spending growth in (Canada was veiy low in
the 1970s, when controls were enacted.
Other countries followed in later years:
France in 1984—85 (giohal hudgets for puh-
lic hospitals) and again in 1993 (giohal bud-
gets for private hospitals); Germany in 1977
(expenditure caps on amhtilatorv' physicians)
and again in 1984-86 (global bndgets for
hospitals); and Japan in the 1980s (lower
I'cvs for physicians and hospitals, and caps
on hospital heds). Figure 1 shows these
conntries generally having less-rapid cost
growth in the 1980s.
Governments in the United States never
controlled enough oftlie medical .S)stem to
adopt wide-scale regulatory controls, but
they did use less-systemic versions of these
techui(jties iu pnblic programs. In 1983, the
federal govenunent adopted the Prospective
Payment System (PPS) lor hospital admis-
sions paid for hy Medicare. Hospitals are
paid a fixed amount per admission condi-
tional on the diagnosis, regardless oi the
services provided.^ A relative weight is es-
tahlished for each diagnosis, and reimburse-
ment is determined on the hasis of the rela-
tive weight and the price per unit weight.
Once the system was estahlished, it was
straightforward for the government to lower
the price paid per unit weight, which it did
in the 1980s and 199()s. Prospective pay-
ment systems spread to Medicaid programs
and many private insurers after it proved
workable in Medicare."* Physician payments
were similarly controlled. In 1992, the fed-
eral government introduced the Resource
Based Relative Value Seale (RBRVS) in
Medicare, which assigned relative weights to
^ Tlie .sy.steni is not (jnite as "Inird" as this. Hospitals
reeeive outlier payments for patient.^ in the lio.spital a
particularly lon^ time, and snrt^ic'ul lulTnissions are
weighted niorc highly than medieal aLlniis.sions.
The Prospective Paviiient System shares sonie sim-
ilarities with incenti\'e4]ased reforms, in that it gives
hospitals incentivt'S to economize on nse of marginal
.ser\ices. Physician pa)'ment reforms did not huiulle
services as highly, and were thus not as high powered.890 Jounml of Economic Literature, Vol XL (September 2002)
TABLE 4
CONTKOLS ADOITED IN THE 198()S .WID 199()S
Ci)untr\'
C:(nii[K)iient of Spending
Hospitals Fl]vsici;ms l'rp.scription Dnigs
Francr
Germany
Italy
U.K.
U.S.
Globit! budgets established
with iiiiiwrsal coyerage;
tightened in 197()s:
C^'rtificate of Need required
tor expansioTi.
1984-S5: Clobiil budgets
iiitrofiiicei! lor piil)lif
1993: f;!obal budgets
introdticeti lor private hospitals.
19S4-S6: Global Ijtulgets
introdiice(i for ho.spitid.s.
199()s: Moye tn>iii per diem
to DRG
Early 1980s: Tighter fee
schedules:
1985-87: Hospital beds and
expansion capped.
Global !iu(!gt'ts L'stahli.shed
v\ith KHS.
19S3: Prospective paymeut
for hospital admissions.
19'S4: Pliysicians uiiist accept
goyenunent payment as
pavinent iti full.
1979: Fee schedules
tightened.
1977: E.xpt'iiditure cap on
auihnlatory care; global
budgets torphysiciau
as.sociatious;
1993: Prescription (inig
budgets tor pliysiciaus.
Early 19H0s: Tightei* fre
Salaries established
\^^th NHS.
1992: Fee schedule (or
physieiaus.
1994: National targets for
phariiiactnticiii expcnditin-e.s.
19S2: Ont-oi-pockrt payments
fordnigs iiicrea.sed.
19S9; Reference pricing
system.
each physician activity. Payment is made on
the basis of the relative weight for the ser-^
vices provided, tnultipHed by a price per unit
weight. Again, the fee schedule has been
tightened o\ er time.
Still, tiie limitation of expenditure con-
trols to the public sector made snch controls
less effective in the United States thim in
other countries. In I960, the average (J7
country spent 12 percent less on medical
care as a sliare of GDP tlian did the United
States. By the early 1990s, spending was
about 35 percent less as a share ot GDP.
Figure 2 shows medical spending as a share
of GDP in 1990. The United States spent far
more than all otJier G7 countries on medical
care.
4. Evaluating^ the Re^tdated System
To understand the consequences of regu-
lated systems, one must look at more thanCutler: International Medical-Care Reform 891
Japan
Figure 2. Medical Spending a,s a Share ot'CDP, 1990
Soiirre: Diita are fimii OK(::D (2000).
just their immediate spending impact.
Spending less money miglit affect the deliv-
er)' of medical care, and this needs to be
taken into account. Further, the long-rnn
impact of these systems must he judged. To
a first approximation, most countries outside
the United States have highly regulated
medical systems, while tlie United States
does not. I thus evaluate regulated systems
by comparing the United States to other ad-
vanced countries.
Kf'gulated systems can save money in two
ways: by lowering prices paid for services or
reducing the qnantit\' of ser\1ces provided.
The two are obviously related—price
changes may lead to quantity changes—but
are couceptualK iuiportant to differentiate.
When there are (juusi-rents in medical-care
provision, as there are iii the return to past
investments by physicians, price reductions
need not be accompanied by reduced supply.
Empiriciil evidence shows that regulation
atlected both prices and qnantities of care
provided, Providers earn less in regulated
systems than they do in unconstrained sys-
tems. Real earnings of physicians in the
United States increased by 35 percent be-
tween 1970 and 1990. In countries with ex-
penditure liuiits, by contrast, real earniugs
were flat. As a result, doctors in the United
States now earn twice what their counter-
parts cam in other countries.'' Physician in-
come is about 20 percent of total medical
spending. Thus, the 50-percent-lower physi-
cian earnings in other G7 countries cau ex-
plain spending differences of about 10 per-
cent. This is close to one-third of the
35-pcrcent overall difference in spending
between the United States and the average
G7 country.
There may be savings in other factor pay-
ments from cost controls, but these will be
smaller. The opportunities for nurses, order-
lies, aud other personnel to move to other
industrie.s prevents a large income reduction
for these groups. Physicians, in contrast, have
much more profession-specific human
capital. Pharmaceutical prices are lower in
regulated systems, altliough the evidence is
not clear on exactly how much. Retail prices
in dnig stores are higher in tlie United States,
but prices to managed-care insurers and
other large purchasers may be lower (Danzon
and Chao 2000). Still, pharmaceuticals
Sonif (i! this is ht-fansc m erall wa^e.s are higher in
tlie United Stiitcs, hut not ninch. Per capita GDP is
ahoiit 10 to 20 percent hijflier in the United States tlian
in other C.7 coLiiitries,892 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XL (September 2002)
are only about 10 percent of overall medical
spending, so price differentials in pharma-
ceuticals cannot account for much of the
overall spending difference. All told, the dif-
ference in prices paid to factors probably ex-
plains a bit under half of total differences in
medical spending between the United
States and other countries.
Price rednctions are, in the short term, a
transfer from medical-care providers to con-
sumers. There may be long-term effects on
the quantity or quality of medical-care per-
soTmel, but tliese effects will not occur for
some time.
Ofmore immediate importance for short-
term outcomes is the impact of regtihition
on service provision. Abundant evidence
shows that service availability is highly corre-
lated with the stringency of regulatory con-
straints. The United States, with the least-
constrained medical system, has the most
technologically sophisticated treatment pat-
terns of any countr); in most dimensions. As
other countries have imposed tighter con-
straints on spending, the rehiti\'e availability
of services has declined.
A rigorous comparison ol how regulation
affects the provision of medical sei^vices re-
(jnires comparing medical care received by
patients with similar conditions in different
countries. This is difficult to do on a wide
scale but is possible in some settings. The
most convincing evidence comes from com-
parisons of the United States and Canada,
where detailed data on patient diagnoses
and treatments are available. The compari-
son between the United States and Canada
has obvious appeal: the demographic char-
acteristics of the two countries are similar,
and physicians are frequently trained at the
same institutions.
Table 5 summarizes evidence on treat-
ment differences in the United States and
Canada. Treatment of cardiovascular dis-
ease, and heart attacks in particular, has re-
ceived the most attention. A heart attack is
an acute event, resulting from a blockage of
arteries supplying blood to the heart. If not
diagnosed early and treated effectively,
death is common. Among elderly people
with a heart attack, one-year mortality is
about 30 percent. Because of this high mor-
tality, essentially everyone with a heart at-
tack will receive medical treatment. Thus,
differential selection into treatment is not
believed to be important.
There are several potential treatments for
a heart attack. Cardiac eatheterization is a
diagnostic procedtire to detect the extent of
arterial blockage. If the blockage is particu-
larly extensive, physicians may decide to
perform either of two revascularization pro-
cethires: b)q;)ass snrgery (creating a blood
How around occluded arteries) or angio-
plasty (inserting a balloon catheter into the
arteries to remove the blockage and restore
blood flow). Most of the studies of heart-
attack treatments across countries analyze
the use of these surgical procedures.
The first four rows of table 5 present re-
sults of studies comparing heart-attack treat-
ments in the United States and Canada. All
of the studies show that the United States
uses the sophisticated technology much
more commonly than does Canada. Cardiac
catheterization is nsed two to five times as
often in the United States, and revascular-
ization is two to eight times more common.
In addition to these studies, two other stud-
ies, reported in the next rows of the table,
examine the share of the overall elderly pop-
nlation receiving byjiass snrgery. Rates of
procedure use are 40 to 80 percent higher in
the United States than in Ganada.
The next row shows differences in screen-
ing for breast and cervical caneer. The re-
sults here are more mixed. While maminog-
raphy rates are twice as high in the United
States as in Ganada, rates of Pap smears and
clinical breast examinations are similar.
Other evidence on cancer treatments across
conntries suggests that the United States is
only about average in rates of intensive pro-
cednre nse. George Silberman et al. (1994)
show that the rate of allogenic bone marrow
transplantation (transplantation with aCutler: International Medical-Care Reform 893
TABLE 5
MKDI(:ALTRE.\TMKNTS AND OUTCOMES INTHF UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Rate (United States : C;ana(:la)
Stiidv ('oiiiparison Treatment Differences Oiittome DifPt'rciice.s
Cardiovascular Disease
Rouleau e( al. (1993) AMI patients in
U.S. and Canada
Catheterization: 1.9:1°°
Revasmlarization: 2.6:1'
Market iil. (1994)
Tuetid. (1997)
Pilote etal. (1994)
Anderson etal.( 1993)
Tn etui. (1997)
Cancer
Katz and Ilofer (1994)
Fstjchiatric Services
Kc.s.sler etal. (1997)
AMI patients in
U.S. and (,';nia(!a
Elderly AMI patients
in U.S. and Ontarto
AMI patients at
Stanford and McGill
hospitals
People in Ciilifoniia,
New York. Oiifario.
Manitoba, iind British
Colnnihia
Pt'opk' in New Yoi'k
iind Ontario
Women 1S+ in
U.S. ;md Ontario
People ill U.S. and
f)ntario
Catheterization: 2.9:1
B\piLss surgerv: 4.7:1'
Anjiiopliist\': 2.6:1°°
(Jiitheterization: 5.2:1
B\pa.ss surgeiy: 7.6:1
AngiopliLsty: 7.8:1°°
Cathfterization: 1.6:1
Bypiiss siirgen': 2..5:r
Angioplasty: 2.3:1°°
Bypass surgery:
CA vs. Canada: 1.8:!-
NY vs. Canada: 1.4:1'
B\pa.s.s snrgerx': 1.8:1'
Piip smear: 1.0:1
Breast exiini: 1.1:1
VI am mogriiphy: 2.1:1
Oiitpiitient trciitment
in iiast vcar: 1.7:1 "
1-year mortality: .98:1
Re infarction: .93:1
Aeti\it\'-limiting angina: .82:1'
1-year mortality: .Ufi:]""
1-year che.st p;iin: .62:1°°
1-year dyspnea: .64:1"°
3()-day mortality: .96:1"
1-year mortalitv: 1.0:1
20-nioritli rcinfaretion: 1.6:1
2l)-iuontli mortality: l.()4:l
2()-nionth angina: .83:1
2()-nK)ntli (unctional status:"
1.26:1°°
Note: " indicates statistical significance at 0.05:'"' indicates sigiiiticance at 0.01.
AMI refers to acute mytjcardiid iiifaretion. or heart attack.
'^ Higlier levels of functional status reflect better health.
donor separate from the recipient) tor peo-
ple with c]ironic lnyeloid leukemia is only
about average in the United States com-
pared to nine other developed countries, al-
though it is uncleiir whether this results
from differences in available donors or char-
acteristics ol medical piiictice. The United
States did have a shorter tiitie from diagnosis
to transplantation, which improves trans-
plantation success.
The final row of table 5 shows rates of out-
patient psychiatric use, The share of people894 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XL (Sq}tetnher 2002)
receiving outpatient treatment lor iiu'iital
illness is 70 percent liiglier in the United
States.'" The e\1dence in table 5 is therefore
generally clear: the United States has much
higher rates of intensive proeednre nse than
does Canada. ^^
The link between limits and less intensive
care raises the specter of worse health ont-
eomes in res^iilated systems. Four of the
studies presented in table 5 examine health
differences in the United States and
Canada.'^ These resnlts are detailed in the
last column of the table. Mortality is the eas-
iest measure of outcomes. Mortality rates
are suqjrisingly similar in the United States
and Canada. One- to two-year mortality
ranges from equal in the two countries to a
few percent lower in the United States, to a
couple of percent higher. Some of the esti-
mates finding lower mortality' in the United
States arc statistically significant, but tliefr
maguitude is uowhere near the two- to
eightfold difference in treatment rates
across countries.
Some studies snggest that morbidity is
lower in the United States. For example,
rates of reinfarction, chest pain, acti\'ity-
liniitiiig augiua, and other complications are
H) to 40 percent lower in the United States
than in Canada. One study estimates fune-
tional outcomes to be better as well, lint
morbidity is very hard to measure. It is not
known how sensitive these results are to dil-
Tliis was not offset by i^rt'atcr use o\ iij
services in Canada.
'•'Tile limited (hitii avaihthlc outside the United
States and Canada support tins inlerenee. An analysis
ot tefiniol()y\' use in heart ;ittaek eare tor niauv
European eonntries. presented hy Dan Kessler. Mark
McClellaii. and C'ulleai;ues (1999), found use nites in
most eonntnes at or beknv tlie (Canadian ievel, and far
below the U.S. level. Steven Sclinteder (1984) slums
that iuispital stafling patterns are also related to spend-
iiifr. More anecdotally, Herny Aaron and William
Sfhwartz (1984) surveyed physieians in the United
States and the Unitei! Kingdom about the treatments
they pnnide. British physicians were far less oriented
to high-tech eare than their American connteqiaris.
'•* For obvions reasons, comparisons ol heahh ont-
conies as awhoie are not particniarly revealing. Indeed,
in a cross-section medical spending and lile expectancy
are negatively, bnt n{)t statistically significantly, related.
fcrent smvey instrnments or factors such as
when in the year the snr\'ey took place.
Overall, the surest outcome measnre is mor-
tality, which is very similar in the two coun-
tries. The Canadian system does much less,
but does not seem to suffer that much.
There are several potential explanations
for the finding of" few mortality differences
despite very large treatment differences.
One explanation is that Canada provides
low-tech care more generously than the
United States, thus offsetting the reduced
use of high-tech care. Rates of medication
usage to prevent long-term heart damage
are notoriously low in the United States.
Further, patients see physicians for evalua-
tive and management care more freqnently
in Canada than in the United States.
Alternatively, wfiat is rationed in Canada
may be care that is not essential for survival.
People who benefit the most from intensive
medical procedures may be equally likely to
receive these procedures in the United
States and Canada, bnt more marginal pa-
tients miglit be disproportionately treated in
the United States.
Whether the lack of adverse outcomes is a
re.suit of l)etter provision of low-teeh care or
efficient rationing is not known. It is an im-
portant topic for research. Bnt regardless of
the explanation, regnlated systems did not
fail becanse of poor heiilth outcomes.
5. The New Dilcnuiuis
In the late 198()s, it seemed as if the solu-
tion to the world's health-care problems was
at hand. Regulatory constraints lowered
costs but still afforded high-quality care. The
poor were not discriminated against, at least
openly.''' Indeed, people expressed satisfac-
tion with these svstems. Fifty-six percent of
Canadians thonght that their medical-care
system was fnndanientally sonnd, compared
to just 10 percent of Americans. Advocates
'•'' Even in eonntries with universal insurance cover-
age, the poor got less medical care than the rich, but
this was not because of price-based rationing.Cutler: International Medical-Care Reform 895
of health-care reform in the United States
followed this evidence and urged the cre-
ation of a Eiiropean-st)'le systein. The
Clinton Administration's national health re-
form proposal reflected this view. The
Clinton plati imposed a limit on the growth
o( health insurance premiums, modeled on
the global budgets enacted in other couu-
tries. As Cutler (1994) discusses, interna-
tional evidence showing the po.ssibility of
lower costs without worse outcomes was a
key factor in tbis proposal.
But enthusiasm for the rationed model
iias waned considerably in the decade since
that time, to the point vvliere even countries
with an ingrained commitment to that tv^je
of system are considering major changes in
medical care. There are three reasons why.
Limited Supphj and Unlimited Demand.
The first problem is standard from economic
theory: when limited siipply is matched with
generons demand-side incentives, people
arc uuhappy that they cannot get the ser-
vices they want. Rationing is easier in med-
ical care than in other industries because
people are not fully informed about what
seivices they uiiglit obtain. Thtis, some ra-
tioning takes place without notice. But as ra-
tioning becomes more severe, patients leam
abotit the limits. Waiting lines are observ-
able, and the lack of care is more pronounced.
As systems became increasingly con-
strained, these problems surfaced. Survey
data shows the extent of this. Robert
Blendon et al. (1990) present results from
common surveys in 1990, asking people in
nine eotmtries to rate their health system us-
ing the qttestion presented in the iutroduc-
tion. Figtire 3 shows the relation between
the sbare of people who were satisfied with
the healtl) system and per-capita spending
ou medical care. People in the United States
are the least satisfied with tbeir medical-care
system, despite the highest spettding. In
probing responses, the reason for this dissat-
isfaction is that people are concerned they
will lose tbeir coverage or bave to pay more
if they become sick. Outside ofthe United
States, this is not a concern; insurance is uui-
versal and gtiaranteed. Indeed, omitting the
United States, tbe dominant isstie explaining
satisfaction with the medical-care system is
spending on medical care.^^ Countries that
spend more on medical care have greater
satisfaction with the medical-care .system. In
most countries, tbe eliief complaint when
people are nnluippy is waiting lists and con-
cern about too icw resources.
Inefficieneij. Tbe second problem with
regulator)' cuu.straiuts is that tbey do not
provide incentives for service provision to
be efficient. A variety of evidence suggests
tliat productive eflicieucy in medical care is
very low. For example, as countries bave re-
duced the fees they pay physicians, one way
tbat physicians have responded is to see pa-
tieuts more freqtieutly—have two visits
wben one might do; prescribe drugs for a
shorter Ieugtb of time so tbat additional vis-
its are needed, et cetera. Tbis type of sched-
uling allows physicians to collect multiple
payuicnt for treatment courses that for-
merly brought in one. Stories about "ini-
btindling" physician services abound in
(>anada, Italy,'^ and Japan,^^ among other
"'The regression line omits the United Stiites he-
catise thf reiLson for disple;tsiire with thf system is so
different.
'' This is (}ftei] called "practice cliiirning." It is dis-
cussed in more detail hy t^ Da\id Na\ lor (1999).
'*^ \\'itne.ss this quote alioiit the Italian liealth-care
system IroiTi a Tiiemher oi Parliament. Carol Beehe
Tanintelli: "There are absolutely no incentives for effi-
ciency. Since hospitals get ]>aid h\- iia\in^ their beds
filled, they are eneoiirageii to keei) ptvjple there for
nnich longer than necessarv. And if (hose beds are oc-
cupied by people who are not so siek. then the hospital
inanajfeiTient figures it is so much the hetter hecanse
they require less care and atteiition. Bnt meanwhile,
people who really need it are .stranded without help.
People often have to wait np to twenty davs in the hos-
pital (or tests to fie done, because the labs are only
open fonr hours a day. So they stay there occupying a
bed that could fie nse<! by soinehody wlio is serionsly
ill—all because the hospital is happy to get money (rom
tlie state for a patient who iloes not recjnire tiiem to lift
a finger" {The Washington Post. April 3. 1994).
"^ A joke abont the Japanese liealtli-care system is
telling: Several elderly people are waitinij in the physi-
cians office, as they do every day. One ol' them asks.
"Wliere is Mrs. Morita? She is not here today." Another
person answers. "She conkln't make it; she is sick."S96
100
so
ca 60
"c
ii 40
20
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XL (September 2002)
1
UK^
-^
Netherlands
Anstralia^^^,^^'^ Cenn;
apaii^^""^ • Sweden
• Italy • US
S50() SI,000 82,500
Safe
$1,500 .S2.0(X)
Per person spending
Figure 3. Medical Speiuling and Sati.sfaction witii the Medical System
c; Spending (liita are from the OECD (2<H)(1). Siitisfactiondata are from Blendonetal. (1990).
Thr regressitiii liiu' omits tlie United States.
S3.000
eonntries.^" The consequence of un-
bundling is that patients wait longer for
care, but this waiting is not counted in
aggregate spending totals.
Other examples concern nse of prescrip-
tion dnigs atid acquisition of high-tech ther-
apies. In Japan, the fee schedule for routine
visits is so low that many physicians earn
money by buving prescription dnigs whole-
sale and selhng them to patients retail.-'
They also earn money by investing in high-
tech scanning equipment and referring pa-
tients to those scanners. The result is that
[apan has extremely high rates of pharma-
ceutical consumption and substantiall) more
scanning technology' than other countries.
^" This phenomenon is not unheard of in the United
States. It is coninioii, for example, for goveninient ac-
tuaries to assume that even' $1 cut in physician pay-
ments made by Medicare will only translate into $.50 in
public sa\in';.s. The remaining H.5ii will be reconped in
increasci! physician volume (the "volnme oi"tset").
^' Low fees in Japan actually date back Imndreds oi
years, to a time when Japanese doctors eanied all tlicir
income from the sale of drug.s.
Althougli tbere are no data on the eifi-
cieney of different systems, efficiency con-
cenis have become predominant in essen-
tially all of tlie G7 eountries (OECD 1998).
As ratiouing and system efficieney be-
come problems, people look for ways
around the limits. Tahle 6 .shows iiumifesta-
tions of this. One way to evade limits is to
ptirchase supplemental insurance. Tn the
United Kingdom. 10-20 percent of the pop-
ulation has some forui ot supplemental in-
surance. Timothy Besley, John Hall, and Ian
Preston (1998) note that this insurance is
fre(juently used to jump the NlIS qneues;
doctors see patients with supplemental in-
surance outside of tlieir normal clinic hours
and vdtli shorter waits. In Italy, supplemen-
tal insurance pays ior doctors not in the
national system.
-- In addition to the n.ses here, snpplernental insnr-
atice in many countrie.s covers scr\iccs uot included in
tlie basic benefits package. This nse is mnch less con-
troversial.Cutler: International Medical-Care Reform 897
ConTitrs'
Canada
France
CIcnnanv
Italy
Japan
U.K.
U.S.
.\'<>f<'.- U.S.
Avaiiabilit\'
Ves
Yes
Yes
Yes
\es
Yes
\es
T.Abl.E (i
MFDICAL C.\KF OHT.IIINED OuTsiDK NATIO.NAL SYSTEMS
Supplemental Insurance
U.sc Pre\alencf
Uncovered seivices
Cost sharing 50%
Uncovered services:
A\-oi(i mandatorv
sickness fund (ii high
income) 8%
Pay foi^ doctors not in
national .sy.stem 5%
Uncovered serxices
Qnene jninpint; 10-20%
Uncovered services;
Cost sharing 6.5%
Other Choices
Small number go to U.S.
Some ph-\-sicians (25%) extra-biU
patients above lee schedule
Pay phvsiciLtn privatelv (pliv.sicians
cati maintain private practice);
Move reffions for medical care
Reports ot bribes to phvsicians for
better care.
row refers to Medicare. Data for other countries are in OECD (1995) and sources cited there.
Direct private payments serve the same
[Toal in Japan, Frauee, Italy, and the United
Kingtioiu. In Japan, there are frequent re-
ports of people paying bribes to physicians
to iiwass waiting lines (Naoki Ikegami
1991).-* In France, some physicians are al-
lowed to •'baianee-hill" patients above the
fee seliedule. This ha.s become a wa\' for rich
people to e\ade the spending limits. And in
Italy; people often pay physicians privately
for more rapid service; physicians are al-
lowed to Jiiaiutain a private practice separate
from their publie practice.-"^
The economics of supplemental insur-
ance is complicated, For a fixed distrihti-
-'^ Especially to get into the large pnhlic hospitals
which liave higher perceived (jualit\.
-' Scandals are common, imoKing doctors who pnr-
chasc cijnipnicntou die pnblic budget but then use the
equipment in tlieir private practice.
tion of medical resources, queue-jumping
by some reduces services for others. Thus,
some countries, such as Canada, have
banned any payment outside the national
system. But allowing sttpplemeiital pay-
ments could also increase the overall
amount of medical-care provision by sup-
porting more providers or by encouraging
existing providers to work additional hours.
This might free up more resources for
those without siippleuientai instirance. No
empirical studies have analyzed these two
effects.
Mobility is another way to evade limits.
In Italy, some areas (particularly in the
north) are well funded while other areas
(southeru Italy) have far lewer medical re-
sources. Intra-countr\' mobility of tbe sick
is common. Some Canadians come to the
United States for medical care, although898 Joumal of Economic Literature, Vol XL (September 2002)
the extent to which this occurs is hotly
contested.^'^
The cominon theme in all of thest" CLises is
that people antl providers attempt to evade
onerous regulatory hmits. As systems be-
came more constrained and less efficient,
the attempts to evade the limits became
more prominent.
One-Time Savings and Lon^-Hiin Cost
Growth. The third problem with regulated
.systems is stnictural: even regulated systems
grew more rapidly than governments could
afford. Figure I shows this situation.
Countries that imposed expenditure con-
striiints generally experienced al)out a
decade of lower cost growth. But after tliat
time, spending growth increased. This hap-
pened in the United Kingdom in the 197()s
(after slow growth in the 196()s), in Canada
in the 19805 (after slow growth in the
1970s), and in Germany and Japan in the
1990s (after slow growth in the 1980s).
The reason for this rebound is the under-
lying dynamic of medical technolog)'.
Expenditure caps did not eliminate techno-
logical change; they just suppressed some of
tlieir manifestations. But ultimately, the
technology was adopted and led to increased
spending. This is clearest in the case of price
reductions. As noted above, a large share of
the savings from expenditure caps was in
lower prices paid to doctors. But quantity
growth is a far more important driver of long-
run cost increase than is price growth. Thus,
priee cuts are an inherently limited way to
rednce spending increases. When prices are
falling, spending growth will slow, but growtli
will then resume when price cuts cease. That
is what happened in many countries.
Even hmits OTI the diffusion of technology
were reliixed over time. Countries allowed
more investment after periods of tightness,
and thus teehnologieal change resurfaced.
Invasive treatments for heart attacks, for ex-
ample, are used more in Canada today than
^^The (Ifhatf is tiiken up liy David Azcvt'do (199,3),
Chuck Jones U993). and Michael Walker and Greg
Wilson (2()01),
in the past, though still below their use in
the United States.
Teehnologieal change is taken here as ex-
ogenous to each country, but that is not nec-
essarily true in aggregate. At the world level,
technological change results at least partly
from the incentives in the medical-care sys-
tem. The traditional medical-care system,
with low cost-sharing and generous physi-
cian payment, ereated substantial incentives
encouraging technological innovation (John
Goddeeris 1984a,b; James Baumgardner
1991; Burtou Weisbrod 1991; Peter Zweifel
and Willard Manning 2000). But the distinc-
tion between one country and the world
inechcal system is important. The large.st
market for medical innovation is the United
States. Innovation is thns geared towards the
U.S. market. At a practical level, therefore,
countries outside ofthe United States could
not control the rate of technical change they
faced. Eveii as these eountries imposed cost
controls, incentives in the United States
were still verv' generous, and tiie pressures
to adopt technology mounted. Most of the
world, therefore, views technical cbange in
medicine, correetly, as independent of na-
tional goveninient actions.
Overall,, cost controls in other countries
lowered the level, but not the long-run
growth, of medical spending. A decade or
so after implementation, the reduction in
cost growth slowed, and costs again began
to increase.
Given the importance of technology in
long-run cost growtb, tbe inability' of regula-
tions to reduce the long-run growth of costs
is not surprising. Since technological change
generally comes from the United States,
other countries bad very little ability to iiffect
the rate of fundamental cost increase. Nor is
the cost inerejise necessarily a cause of con-
cern. The key issue in evaluating medical-
care cost increases is wliether tbe services
bouglit by the increiise in cost are wortb tbe
money that is spent on them. There is no de-
finitive answer to this question, but much re-
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may be worth the expeii.se (Cutler imd
McClellan 2001). If thi.s is true generally,
eouiitries ma)- he better oil" socially with cost
increases and financing pressures than with-
out them. Whether cost increases are good
or bad is ultimately an empirical question.
In practice, the failure of constrained sys-
tems to limit cost growth led to tremendous
nnea.se,about these systems. In the 1980s,
Canada iacetl a resurgence ot cost growth,
alter a period of slow growth in the 1970s.
Hy the early 1990s, governments in Canada
were imposing new limits on fees, closing
hospitals, and tightening resource limits.
The (Canadian popniation, which thought
tli(^ medical-care linancing system was sta-
ble, was upset by the required actions.
Confidence in the medical system dropped
dramatically. Whereas 56 percent of
C'auadians were satisfied with the system in
the late 1980s, only 29 percent were satisfied
in 1994, and only 20 percent were satisfied
in 1998. Cutbacks have provoked similar
controversy in other countries as wel!.-*^ As
the 199()s progressed, unease about the
medical system grew.
6. The Third Wave: Incentives
and Competition
As long-run cost containment lias grown
elusive and inefficiency in the medical sys-
-'' In Krancf, fur c'xaiiipJi', th<^ fjoviTiinient in 1996
pronosL'd siihst;iiitiul rediictioiis in ihe hndticts liir lios-
pitiu.s iiiul pliysiciaiLS. UndtT the propiiscd reforms, if
physicians overspent the annual ()l)|cctive set hv tlie
govennnerit, the imniially negotiated fee striiftiire for
inedieal aets wonld not be iiierc;ised. Individual phy.si-
eians responsible for overspendinj; would lia\e to re-
turn part of their ineoinc. Physician.s who viohitcd
liiiideline.s for prescription of services would have to ex-
plain their aetions to loeal and regional eonniiissions.
Tlie government wonld ha\e paid lower reirnhnrse-
inent rates for patients who \1site(! a lio.spital or s|ieeial-
ist withont ihst seeing a general practitioner. Hospitals
woiiid he more heavily regiiiatetl hy regional liospital-
ization agencies, wliicli wonld eonlrol all finaTicitig ;irid
capacity. Fin;ilfy. the govennncnl arbitrarily decided to
tax the pharmaceutical industry" with it one-time le\y of
$5()() million. The proposed reforms encountered huge
opposition Irom doctors and resulted in numerous
strikes. A new sociaii.st governinent was elected.
tem has become more prominent, health-
care reform bas again coine to dominate
the agendas of OECD governments. The
issues are remarkably similar in different
countries-the rising costs of care and the
perceived inefficiency of the .system
(Colleen Flood 2000). ^But in the face of
these recent difficulties, governments
have turned away from strict reliance on
rationing and controls, to a more pluralis-
tic view of ways to limit mediea! spending,
The resnlt is the beginning of a third wave
of health-care reform, focusing on incen-
tives, and in particular competition, as
central elements in the medical .system.
Table 7 shows some characteristics of these
reforms.
To date, incentive-based reforms bave
been only partial. (Joveniincnts have a natu-
ral inclination to go slowly in any situation as
important as medical care. Further, tbere
are substantive reasons for caution.
Incentives in medical care are not always
aligned in socially optimal ways, and relying
on incentives may lead to poor outcomes.
The most important misalignment is the po-
tential for sick people to suffer in a competi-
tive medical-care system, sinee payments for
them do not always cover their costs. Finally,
the commitment to cquit\' is a major stum-
bling block. A significant sliare ofthe popn-
iation still sees medical care as a right, not a
good. Social solidarity is a unifying factor in
many countries, and the idea of using incen-
tives to allocate medical care risks violating
this solidarity (Uwe Reiiihardt 1997). For all
ol these reasons, competitive reforms have
been tentative. Whether to employ these
mechanisms more is a major question facing
many countries,
Incentive-based reforms are of three
t\pes. At the patient level, some reforms in-
crease eosts paid when nsing services.
Increiising cost-sharing reduces government
spending directly, by redirecting some costs
to individuals and away from taxpayers. It
also reduces demand for seivices, saving ad-
ditional resources.900 foumal of Econotnie Literature, Vol XL (September 2002)
Increased cost-sharing has been pursued
in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and
Japan. In Canada and France, the increa.se
in cost-sharing has been relatively minor.
For example, in Canada cost-.sharing has in-
ereased marginally and some marginal .ser-
vices have heen "dc-insured" (dental ser-
\'ices for children; vision exams).^' In other
countries, the increase in cost-sharing has
been greater. In Japan, 1997 reforms in-
creased coinsurance rates from 10 to 20 per-
cent of total medical hills for those insured
through the uatioiuil health program.-*'' In
Germany, there were large increases in co-
payments for preseripHon drugs in the 1990s.
Debate aljout iurther increases in cost-
sharing continues. In Japan, proposals were
recently made to increase cost-sharing an
additional 10 pereent, hut these were
dropped after provoking opposition. Even in
Canada, there is discussiou of a "two-tiered"
medical-care system, where the government
would insure basic services, and private in-
surance would cover the rest. Iu one recent
survey, over 40 percent of Canadians sup-
ported such a systeui. Support drops,
though, when potential inequities between
rich and poor are highlighted (Gallup 1996).
Other countries have introduced compe-
tition at the level of insiu'anee purchase
rather than at the time services are used.
Allowing insurers to compete with one an-
other, it is hoped, will increase the efficiency
of service provision while saving nioney.^^^
Insurance market eompetition has been
'^' Tlierf is currently a coutrnvcrsy in Ciinada ii.s to
which st-mces are "medically nece.ssaiy." ami provinces
are iiegiiiniug to (liF(eren(i;ilK (If-in.siirc various ser\ices
a.s a nietlitxl ol eost eontiiiiiiiieiit. For exaninlc. Pritne
Minister Jean Chrftieji stated in 199.5: "Notiody lose.s
his iuinie beciiusc somebody lias a prohleni witli his
teeth or eyes, noniially. But it you have major sur^eiy.
it's something else, so Vieclicarc wiis intendc'd tor that."
-'' The iTicrease in c()pa\nnents was meant to be con-
ditinnal on more fundamental relorms to the system,
incluilin^ elimination ot" priee differentials between
wholesale and retiul drugs, hut tlu'sc retoriiis were
postponed due to vigorous protests Irom physician as-
socirttions and pharmaeeutieal compiinies.
-•' Proposals for insuruiice market reform often gu
niider the rnhric ot "niiiiiiigetl competition" (Alain
most proniineut in the United States. While
the United States never had a heavily regu-
lated system, it did have a very generous sys-
teui historically, with few eonstridnts on ei-
ther the demand or supply side. Prior to the
198()s, most employers in the United States
contracted with jnst one insurance company,
which ran the traditional ])lan.
In response to decades of rising h^iilth in-
surance preminms, companies hegiui to shop
around tor less-exjiensive insurance options.
Some companies switelied their insurance en-
tirely to lower-cost insurers, geneniUy to man-
aged-care insurers. Others created competi-
tion hetween plans for enrollment. The
traditional iudenmity plan was still offered,
hnt so were lower-priced managed-care plans.
Being lower cost, managed-eare plan.s were at
a snlxstantial advantage. The cost advaTitage
was compounded by adverse selection, which
led to premium differences far larger thau dif-
ferences in benefits alone would suggest
{Cutler and Sarah Reher 1998). The result
was an enorinoiLs change in plan enrollment.
Between 1980 aud 2000, insurance for the
privately insured population went from o\'er
90 pereent in unmanaged indemnity insur-
ance to over 90 percent iu managed eare.
These incentives at the insurer level led to
substantial emphasis on eost savings.'^"
Insurers first reduced tlie prices the)' paid to
providers. No systematic evidence ou prices
paid hy mauaged-care insurers is available, but
tlie studies that have been coudueted suggest
price reductions of up to 30 percent for some
high-teeh senices (Cutler, McClellau. and
Newhouse 2(K)0). These price rednetions are
similar to what happened in other countries
when medical spending WILS rednced. But the
meclianism used in the United States wtLs a hit
different. Coverumeuts in other couutries
eould simply lower prices for all providers
Eiithoveu 1993). Managed eompetition was one basis
for the Clinton Health Plan iu tiie United States, along
with heallh reform [)lans in other cnnntries snch as the
Netherlands.
'"' Slieriy Glied (2000) reviews the literature on
managed care.Ctttler: International Medical-Care Reform 901
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TABLE 7
E REFORM IN THK 199t)s
Count IT Reform I.ssues
Canada 1991: Federal payments to provinces cut;
1991: Tighter supply-.sidf limits by provinces
—t'losing/nierging of hospitals
Franc'e 1996 proposal; Global biiiiget for tlie health
system as a whole
—review of physician.s responsible for o\ erspending
—regional hospital agencies (o manage funding
—increase patient copajirieiits
German)- 19N9 Health Relbnn Act:
—reference prices for phannaceiiticiils
—increased patient copayments
—-mode.stiy reduce coven'd services
1993 Health Care Structure Reform Act:
—hmit growtli of spending to growth ol wages
^more bundling of hospital payments
—increiLse patient copayments
—risk adjustment of sickness funtls
—in 1997. workers to have cboice of sickness funds
1997 reforni:
—increased patient copajiiients
Italy 1992 reform:
—create regional enteqirises to limit spending
—regional enteiprises can contract ont services
—standardize government allocation to different
regions
—hospitals can become independent
—patients can pa\' more tor better hospital facilities
—in 1995, patients can opt out of SSN
Potential cutback in public coverage (dental
care; vision exams)
Vigorons protests from physicians, union
Vigor()n.s opposition from providers
Northern areas upset by loss oi' funds;
private sector has grown.
tmikiterally. Maiiaged-care insurers, in con-
tiiist, had to hiirgiiiii for price reductions. Tlie
leverage manuged-care insurers used was tlie
ability to exclude providers from their net-
work. As a result, lower prices came aloTig\\1tli
constrained access to providers in tlie United
States, where it did not in other countries.
Managed-care insurers also cut back ou the
receipt of some care. Insurers intensively
uionitorcd what providers ditl, and enacted fi-
naucial incentives for providers to do less.
Many priinar)' care physicians, for e.Kamplc,
are paid on a capitation basis—they are reim-
bursed a lee covering their own costs and part
or iUl of hospital and physiciiin costs. Spending
less on one's own practice or purchased ser-
vices increases die physicians earnings, while
sj^endiiig inore cuts income. When hospitals
are paid hy the plan, they are no longer pmd
on a fee-for-servicc basis; instead, they receive
payments per day in the liospital or per admis-
sion. The result has been a large redttction in
the number aud length of hospitalizations,
and less ordering of tests and procedures.
Managed care was successful iu reducing
cost growth. Between 1993 and 1999, med-
ical spending in the United States was con-
stant as a share of GDP, after rising continu-
ously since World War 2. Figure 1 shows the
much lower growth rate of costs in the902 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol XL (Sej}temher2002)
TABLETfCmi/.
Count lA Rei'orm Issues
Japan 1997 reform:
—-snb.stantial increase in patient coinsurance:
—eliminate mandated price for pharmaeeuticals
U.K. 1990 Nationd Htuilth Service and Comnninitv'
Care Act:
—-CPs become •'fiindliolders"—receive capitated
payment ont of wliich they pay for services
(drugs, inpatieiit bospital.s. emergency
care)
—Hospitals become "tnists"-—similar to not-for-
profit busines.ses
1998 reform:
—local Healtli Action Zones created to set health
goals and coordinate groups
—Priniar)' Care Groups made up of all physicians
in an area will replace tiiiKlholders
U.S. 1993 proposal:
—universal insurance coverage, financed by
employer and individiuil mandate
—limit on increase in iasiirance premiums
1996 Heallli fnsnrance Portabilitv' and Accountability
Act;
—guarantee [M)rtabilit\ of insurance ior job to job
transitions
1997 liaianced Budget Act:
—expand choices in Medicare
Vigorous opposition from providers, which
prevented passage
Que.stions about whether GP fiindholders
could bypass waiting lists; concern about
competition instead of ccKjperation
National health proposal failed to pass;
substantial debate iibiint public and private
roles in medical care
Uuited States in the 199()s than in previous
decades. Compared to historical growth
rates, medical costs hy 1999 were ahout 10
percent below expected levels.
As in other countries that have cut back,
the evidence surveyed by Robert Miller and
Harold Luft (1997) suggests that most man-
aged-care savings have come without ad-
verse health consequences. There seeuis to
have been enough waste aud excessive fees
to allow significant squet^zing without wors-
ening patient outcomes.
Still, even with a far less egalitarian start-
ing point in the United States than in other
coimtries, incentive-based reforms like the
managetl-care revolution have encountered
enormous hostility. Many of the issues are
familiar from other countries. With gener-
ous demand-side incentives but constraints
on the supply side, people are uuhappy that
they cannot get all the care they want.
Maiiagcd-care rationing is a major concern.
Further, adverse sclectiou has beeu a major
side effect of managed care (Cutler and
Richard Zeckhauser 2000). And where the
Uuited States lias a comuiitment to equitv^-,
as in tbe Medicare program, there is a fear
about managed care eroding that. One of the
arguments against creating more insurance
market competition in Medicare is tliat itCutler: International Medical-Care Refonn 903
would reduce the universality ofthe system.
As a result, policy is now facing a "managed-
care backlash" more tlum a desire to in-
crease medical-eare competition.
Steps to increase insurance market com-
petition have not been confined to the
United States. In Italy, legislation taking ef-
fect in 1995 allowed people to opt out ofthe
social .security system to obtain private
health insurance. In (ierniany, legi.shition
enacted in 1993 and expanded in 1997 al-
lows all eitizen.s the right to choose among
competing "sickness" funds, us only higher-
income workers were previously able to
do.'^' At the time the law was enacted, there
were about 1,000 sickness fnnds, so tliere
was the potential for significant eompetition.
Plan choiee in Germany has had some
salutary effects on the medical system
(Lawrence Brown and Volker Amelung
1999). Sickness fnnds are catering more to
individual demands than they tised to, in-
cluding emphasis on health promotion and
expansion of benefits to itidude cotnple-
mentary and alternative medicine.
Consumers face tradeoffs between plan
generosity and priee where previously there
were none.
But the degree of competition is limited.
While people can choose in.surunce com-
panies, the companies are reqtiired to pay
doctors on the same negotiated pay scale.
Ftirther. plans cannot selectively contract
with particular providers. Insurance is still
seen as separate from medical-care provi-
sion. Thus, there is not mueh that plans
can do to really change the nature of care
provision.
To some extent, this was the desired out-
come. At the time of the German reforms,
there was conceni that competition would
lead to sick people being denied coverage or
discouraged from enrolling in particular
plans. While payments to plans are partly
adjusted for the health risk of enrollees, the
•'^ The {icririaii leyi shit ion followed rcrorms pro-
posed in the Nt^thcrlands in 1987 (Frededk Schut
1995),
adjustment factors used are not particularly
extensive (age, sex, family status, and in-
come). Were eompetition more intense,
plans eould nse more sophisticated selection
tnechanisms to limit their exposure to siek
people,'^- In addition, tliere was concern
that competition wotild come at the expense
of social solidarity. Differential access to
medical-care providers violates the long-
shared goal that the medical .system should
treat everyone equally.
As a result, the overall impact of the
German reforms has been modest. Germans
periodically debate whether to extend the
reforms or baek off from them. Competition
has a natural constituency because the alter-
natives are not very appealing. The tradi-
tional way that Germany controlled medical
costs was to rethice fees to hospitals and
physicians. Decades of acrimonious negotia-
tions hetween insurers, governments, and
providers led to immense frustration with
that system. On the other hand, if eompeti-
tion has little effect on costs—and the partial
nature of reform, combined with the funda-
mentals of technology diffusion, virtually
guarantee this ontcome—the competitive
system may be seen as a failure as well. The
deeision between enacting even more com-
petitive reforms or reverting to the old sys-
tem would be a diffienlt one (Brown and
Amelung 1999).
A third set of eotmtries has attempted to
introduce incentives within tlie provider
community. The leading country taking this
approach is die United Kingdom,'^^ The ma-
jor British reform was the National Hedth
Service and Gomniunity Care Act of 1990,
passed by the Thatcher Administration
(Julian LeGrand 1999), The thrust of the
Thatcher reforms was to separate tlie pnr-
ehase of medical care from the provision of
^~ One health insurer wrote a letter to its diabetic en-
roliees, pointing out that another plan was known to
treat tliat fondition particularly well,
•'•' Internal markets have also been created in Italy,
Under a 1992 rflorni. larger hospitals are allowed to
become independent public agencies, and can charge
patients extra for services.904 jottmal of Economic Literature, Vol. XL (September 2002)
services. Most importantly, the Act allowed
prinuiA' eare physicians to beeonie "fimd-
liolders." F"undlu)klers received a budget to
purchase services such as elective surgery and
o\itpatient phannaceiitieals.'^"' Funderholders
could negotiate pavment rates with hospitals,
and, to some extent, control outj^iatient phiir-
maeeutical use. Fundhoklers could keep the
surplus if spendiug was below the budget,
provided that the money was reinvested iu
the practice. Most general practitioners be-
came fuudholders. In addition, uiost hospitals
were inoved out of the public sector aud
made into "tnists"—souiewhat similar to the
uot-for-profit hospital in tbe Uuited States.
Hospital tnists have iudependent governing
bodies, which make decisions about techno-
logical iivailabilitv ;md pricing.
Separating tbe purchasing of care from
the provision of care had some real effects.
Studies by Howard Glennerster, Mauos
Miitsaganis, and Pat Oweus (1994) and
Carol Propper and Neil Soderlund (1998)
show that prices paid bv fundbolders ibr
iLOspital seivices tell relative to prices paid
by non-fundholders. Conrad Harris and
Cileu Scriveuer (1996) show that fundhokl-
ers had lower prescriptiou drug speuding
tban did uon-fnndbolders. Bernard Dowling
(1998) demoustrates that waitiug times for
patients of fuudholders fell relative to wait-
ing times for nou-fundholder physicians.
But iu other ways, the reforiu was teuta-
tive. Hospital trusts were still significantly
regulated. Public approval was required for
investment and capital decisions, aud tnists
could uot keep auy surpluses they gener-
ated. They also had an iuiplieit claim on the
public sector if they rau a deficit. As a result,
the financial incentives tnists operated un-
der did not encourage much change in care
delivery'. Tbis was reinforced by the general
desire of regional health authorities to avoid
closing hospitals. Overall, while empirical
evidence shows some salutary effects of the
•^ Not iill of the pavments for these services come
out of the same capitation amount. In atkfitioii, there
Wits reinsurance for ver}' higli-cost cases.
creation of primary care fundhoklers, the
creation of hospital trusts did not seem to
have major impacts on care (LeGrand
1999).
But even diese tentative reforms bave pro-
voked considerable controversy, (>)uceru
about adverse selectkni limited the extent to
whicb incentives were tried at the start.
Further, the emphasis on competition ratber
than cooperation upset many. Indeed,
Britain's Labor government elected iu the
late 1990s explicitly opposed the emphasis
on competition. It reformed tbe system to a
"cooperative" model, away from the "com-
petitive" model. General practitioners have
been grouped into primar\' care groups, to
jointly manage capitation payments for tbe
people tbey serve.
But the Labor government did not com-
pletely backtrack, and incentives have actu-
ally been strengthened in some dimensions.
For example, hospital tnists arc now allowed
to keep surpluses they generate, providing
more incentive to limit the care they pro-
vide. Similarly, primaiy care gronps will be
allowed to retain surpluses as well, provided
they are reinvested in the practice. The
United Kingdom is thus experimenting with
A balance between incentives and regula-
tion, as are many other countries.
7, Sttitunanj
The slowness and zigzagging of reform in
virtually all countries reflects many factors.
Fear of making too sudden a cbange is an
important brake. So too is concern uboiit un-
wanted ontcomes suob as adverse selection.
And equity concerns liave played u large role
as well. Since World War 2, countries have
taken pride in kecpiug the market out of
mediciue. Reversing this commitment is
veiy difficult.
Arthur Okun formalized tiie tradeoff
between equality und efficiency a quarter-
century ago. Medical-care reform has that
tradeoff aud more. Not only are etjuidit) and
efficiency in conflict, but both are hostage toCutler: International MedicaJ-Care Refonn 905
tiie increasing cost ot the system. As medical
cure becomes more expensive, the tradeoff
between eqnality and efficiency becomes
even more difficult. How countries balance
these three factors—the desire for equalit)-;
the goal of efficiency, and the increasing cost
ol medical care—will ha\e major implications
for medical-care systems for decades to coine.
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